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NOTES
LOSS-SHIFTING AND QUASI-NEGLIGENCE: A NEW
INTERPRETATION OF THE PALSGRAF CASE
I
In 1928 the New York Court of Appeals denied recovery to Mrs. Palsgraf
for injuries she sustained from the falling arm of a cracked scales which struck
her while she was standing on the platform of the defendant's railroad. The
scale beam had been loosened by the explosion of a package of fireworks which
two railroad employees had negligently dislodged from a passenger's arm while
pushing him on a moving train. From the evidence it was clear that the de-
fendant's employees had no reason to know that the package in question con-
tained explosives.'
In declaring that there was no case for the jury, the court could have said that
there was no "actionable negligence," that there was no violation of a "duty of
care," or that the defendant's negligence was not a "proximate cause" of the
plaintiff's injury. Mr. Justice Cardozo, speaking for the majority, preferred the
first approach. He set forth a re-examination of the negligence concept with the
hope of replacing the usual formulas and their "shifting meanings" with a more
precise analysis and of bringing clarity to a field of law that had become a play-
ground for conceptualism and patent arbitrariness. His opinion has since pro-
voked both praise2 and skepticism.3
In spite of frequently recurring opportunities, relatively few judges have
adopted Chief Justice Cardozo's new approach. Only fourteen state courts and
four federal circuit courts appear to have mentioned the Palsgraf case at all, and
twelve of these do so but once.4 Even the New York courts, which continually
r Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). No attempt will be
made in this note to review the well-known controversies in this field. Even a bibliography
seems unnecessary in view of the exhaustive and thorough study by Carpenter on Proximate
Cause now being published inhis series of articles in i4 So. Cal. L. Rev. i (i94o), iis (1941).
In addition see Green, Rationale of Proximate Cause (1927); Gregory, Proximate Cause in
Negligence-A Retreat from "Rationalization," 6 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 36 (1938); Morris, On
the Teaching of Legal Cause, 39 Col. L. Rev. 1087 (1939); Harper, Liability Without Fault
and Proximate Cause, 30 Mich. L. Rev. iooi (1932); Prosser, Torts (I94r).
2 Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 372, 381 (i939);
Kessler, Die FahrIlssigkeit im nordamerikanischen Deliktsrecht 78, 123 (1932).
3 Gregory, op. cit. supra note i, at 44, 48,49; Morris, op. cit. supra note r, at iiog; Green,
The Palsgraf Case, 30 Col. L. Rev. 789, 791 (1930) ("Put as baldly as possible, the question
was simply whether the railroad company should bear the risk."); Prosser, The Minnesota
Court on Proximate Cause, 21 Minn. L. Rev. 19, 33 (1936); Cowan, The Riddle of the Palsgraf
Case, 23 Minn. L. Rev. 46 (1938).
Casenotes published shortly after the decision show an interesting variety of first impres-
sions of the case. 13 Minn. L. Rev. 397 (1929); 24 Ill. L. Rev. 325 (1929); 14 Corn. L. Q.
94 (1928); 8 Boston U. L. Rev. 159 (1928); 3 St. John's L. Rev. 117 (1928); 27 Mich. L. Rev.
I24 (1928). 29 Col. L. Rev. 53 (1929) pleads for the abolition of the "duty to the plaintiff"
theory in favor of a broad distribution of risk.
4 Apart from the courts of New York State, only the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit appears to have attempted seriously to utilize the doctrine of the Palsgraf case. The
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use Cardozo's succinct phraseology, have preserved their old formulations and
frequently do not attempt to apply his analysis. Perhaps the courts find his
rationale too subtle for easy application, and indeed it is possible that they do
not always understand it.s This failure has increased the number of those who
despair of the common law system of liability for negligence and has strength-
ened the argument of those who urge that its administration be taken from the
courts.6 But it is submitted that the Palsgraf case itself might be utilized to
clarify the common law system and thus to achieve without the assistance of
legislation a practicable solution in terms of the underlying economic realities.
II
Before the decision in the Palsgraf case, writers and judges had relied almost
unanimously7 on the dicta of Smith v. London & S. W. R. Co.8 in defining liabil-
ity for negligence. According to this approach, foreseeability of "any" harm char-
acterized negligence. And where courts had differed in applying this approach,
they substantially agreed in focusing attention upon the defendant's behavior,
as such, without emphasizing its relation to the plaintiff's damage.9 Cardozo
repeated that there is no such thing as "negligence in the air"1°0-that negligence
must always be related to a person or class of persons" toward whom the de-
Glendola, 47 F. (2d) 206 (C.C.A. 2d 193); Pease v. Sinclair Refining Co., 1o4 F. (2d) 183
(C.C.A. 2d i939); Sinram v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 61 F. (2d) 767 (C.C.A. 2d 1932); Kennedy v.
E. H. Scott Transportation Co., 6o F. (2d) 717 (C.C.A. 2d x932). Citations of the Palsgraf
case have increased markedly during the last few years.
' See, e.g., Zelenko v. Gimbel Bros., i58 Misc. 904,287 N.Y. Supp. 134 (S. Ct. 1935). Justice
Cardozo in the Palsgraf case stresses the point that "the law of causation, remote or proximate,
is .... foreign to the case ..... " 248 N.Y. 339, 346, x62 N.E. 99, 101 (1928). But this does
not prevent his opinion from being occasionally cited as an authority on the law of causation.
Di Blase v. Ewart & Lake, Inc., 228 App. Div. 407, 240 N.Y. Supp. 132 (193o); Hatch v.
Globe Laundry Co., 132 Me. 379, 171 AtI. 387 (i934); Kaufman v. Boston Dye House, Inc.,
28o Mass. ifi, 182 N.E. 297 (1932).
6Note 5iinfra. 7 For a concise discussion of other theories see Gregory, op.cit. supra note i.
8 L. R. 6 C. P. i4 (Ex. Ch. 1870). The defendant's engine set fire to cuttings left on a railroad
right of way during a drought. The fire spread and burned the plaintiff's cottage some two
hundred yards away. In allowing recovery, Channell, B. said (at 21): "When it has been once
determined that there is evidence of negligence, the person guilty of it is equally liable for its
consequences, whether he could have foreseen them or not."
9 For a discussion of the various theories of this "absolute" negligence see Goodhart, The
Unforeseeable Consequences of a Negligent Act, 39 Yale L. J. 449 (1930); Carpenter, op. cit.
supra note i. The Restatement of Torts (1934) is using the term negligence in an "absolute"
(§§ 282, 283) and a "relative" (§§ 284, 289(a), 293 (b), 43 3 (b), 4 5i(b)) sense at the same time.
o Citing Pollock, Torts 455 (ixth ed. 1920). This phrase has become the most frequently
cited passage from the Palsgraf case, in spite of its ambiguous meaning.
" While Mr. Justice Cardozo's opinion speaks only of a relation to the plaintiff, subsequent
cases interpreting it have generally extended the doctrine to the plaintiff's class. Sinram v.
Pennsylvania R. Co., 6i F. (2d) 767 (C.C.A. 2d 1932); Rest., Torts, Comment on § 281(b)
(1934). This extension, although indispensable to the applicability of the Palsgraf doctrine,
is a first step toward its dilution. See infra pp. 731 ft.
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fendant was under a duty of care. The existence of such a duty depends on
whether the defendant can reasonably anticipate that his act will create a
hazard to the plaintiff or to his class. Lest too narrow a restriction of liability
result from thus making negligence a concept of relationship, Cardozo himself
proposed an "absolute" application of his theory by suggesting "that negligence
.... in relation to the plaintiff would entail liability for any and all conse-
quences, however novel or extraordinary.' 2
This notion, if taken literally, might occasionally result in a complete de-
parture from the "foreseeability" test in favor of what may be called "trans-
ferred negligence"'3-that is to say, when admitted negligence exists toward
some interest of the plaintiff, liability might ensue for simultaneous damage to
some other interest of the plaintiff, though far removed from the scene of im-
mediate hazard and not foreseeably endangered. To obviate the possibility of
this result, Cardozo suggests a distinction within the plaintiff's sphere of protec-
tion "according to the diversity of interests invaded."'-4 Thus he introduces an
additional element of relationship by implying that if the plaintiff's property
alone is foreseeably endangered while only his person is actually harmed, the
plaintiff should not recover. But even with this qualification, Cardozo's theory
might produce singular results. For example, while Mrs. Palsgraf is left without
a remedy, the prospective passenger toward whose personal property (the
package he carried under his arm) the defendant's servants were negligent
might recover for damage from the unforeseeable explosion to other property of
his remotely situated. Perhaps Judge Learned Hand was justifiably ironical in
the Glendola case' s when he observed: "A difference in ownership of .... two
pieces of property, successively injured, might exonerate a wrongdoer as to that
injured last, though he would be liable had both been owned by a single per-
son."
Professor Goodhart 6 emphasized the same difficulty by suggesting an al-
tered version of the Polemis case.' 7 In that case, it will be recalled, a servant of
12 248 N.Y. 339, 346, Y62 N.E. 99, 1o (1928). This addition was adopted by many courts
applying the Palsgraf doctrine. See, e.g., Slavin v. State, 249 App. Div. 72, 291 N.Y. Supp.
721 (1936).
'3 Cowan, op. cit. supra note 3, at 49.
X4 248 N.Y. 339, 347, 162 N.E. gg, io (1928). See Rest., Torts § 281, Illustration 3 (1934),
adopting this suggestion.
ISThe Glendola, 47 F. (2d) 206, 207 (C.C.A. 2d 1931). But in Sinram v. Pennsylvania R.
Co., 61 F. (2d) 767 (C.C.A. d 1932), Judge Learned Hand expressly accepts the doctrine
of the Palsgraf case for maritime torts.
16 Goodhart, op. cit. supra note 9, at 466. See also Campbell, Duty, Fault, and Legal
Cause, [1938] Wis. L. Rev. 402, 413.
X7 In re Polemis v. Furness, Withy & Co., [1921].3 K. B. 560. The Polemis case ought not,
however, to be applied to situations similar to that in the Palsgraf case, since it involves con-
tract liability determined by the intent of the parties. See Salmond and Winfield, Contracts
5o6 (1927).
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the defendant-charterer of the plaintiff's ship negligently dropped a plank into
the hold of the vessel, foreseeably endangering the ship, but not foreseeably
threatening the actually ensuing hazard of destructive fire which was caused by
the ignition of fumes of benzine by a friction-spark. Professor Goodhart as-
sumes that therefore under the Pasgraf doctrine the owner of the cargo could
not have recovered and asks the question whether the result would be different
had the cargo belonged to the owner of the ship. Professor Gregory avoids the
difficulty by interpreting the Palsgraf case to mean (i) merely "that a defendant
is not liable to a plaintiff towards whom he is not negligent, not that a defendant
is liable to everyone towards whom he is negligent," and (2) that liability must
depend on the foreseeability of the general hazard or danger which brings about
the harm complained of."S Thus Professor Gregory believes that if Cardozo had
been disposing of the tPolemis case and was convinced that the evidence dis-
closed only foreseeability of harm to ship, cargo or crew from the impact of a
falling plank but did not warrant the reasonable inference of fire, he would have
denied recovery for the loss of the ship and cargo, whoever owned both or
either of them. Professor Gregory's interpretation, shared by most of the courts,
extends the doctrine of the Palsgraf case beyond its actual facts (which might be
called the "unforeseeable plaintiff"'9 situation) and applies it to fact situations
involving a "foreseeable" plaintiff and an unforeseeable hazard. The effect of
this prevailing interpretation is to restrict liability to an extent not contem-
plated by Cardozo, although frequently this result has induced the courts to
dilute the concept of foreseeability in order to correct the restrictive tendency.
Chief Justice Cardozo may have foreseen this difficulty, since he himself sug-
gested that in his foreseeability test "perhaps other distinctions may be neces-
sary." How far, if at all, courts purporting to follow the Palsgraf case may have
created such distinctions, and how far such distinctions may be desirable remains
to be seen.
III
Although all attempts to formulate the .Palsgraf doctrine have been unsatis-
factory, the peculiar circumstances of those cases in which courts have em-
ployed language from Cardozo's opinion suggest clues to its real significance and
most feasible adaptation. Of sixty-odd such cases, at least three-fourths in-
volve the vicarious liability of large enterprises, and most of the others involve
injuries from "negligently" driven automobiles.20 The problem in these cases is
18 Gregory, op. cit. supra note i, at 46. Many cases employ the "hazard" language. Pease v.
Sinclair Refining Co., io4 F. (2d) 183 (C.C.A. 2d x939); Benenson v. Nat'l Surety Co., 26o
N.Y. 299, x83 N.E. 5o5 (1932).
'9 Prosser, op. cit. supra note i, at 182.
20 Automobile liability is approaching a stage similar to vicarious liability in proportion to
the spread of liability insurance. The insured motorist takes the place of the agent, the com-
munity of the insured through their insurer the place of the principal in instances of true
vicarious liability.
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to establish a standard of liability based on economic and social considerations.
This standard, in spite of its "moral" origin, has come virtually to signify strict
liability without fault,21 for the dangerous nature of the enterprise and the in-
evitable risks which may be absorbed as overhead costs have become the real
bases of liability. Courts and writers are compelled to fix the limits of this strict
liability in terms of the only available common law concepts, i.e., the "moral"
concepts of negligence, foreseeability, fault and duty." Thus the servant-
tortfeasor most frequently appears merely as an excuse for utilizing the law of
negligence through the medium of the familiar doctrine of respondeat superior. 23
Perhaps the reluctance of courts frankly to admit this accounts for the enig-
matic character of the institution of vicarious liability. At any rate, implicit
features in vicarious liability cases tend to suggest these conclusions. Thus
courts frequently-particularly in manufacturers' liability cases-hold the em-
ployer liable in the absence of express assertions of the employee's negligence
and sometimes even without revealing the identity of his person. Again, where
such a description is made, the employer is often treated as the tortfeasor with
regard to the question of foreseeability.24 A similar technique for placing the
"blame" on the enterprise is the fiction of non-delegable duties in "independent
contractor" cases. On the other hand, restrictive devices such as the "inde-
pendent contractor" notion are used to limit liability of an enterprise in spite of
its alleged employee's negligence, where the enterprise seems to be a less de-
sirable medium for the spreading of the risk and loss than is the alleged "serv-
ant" in question.2S And a most significant indication of this whole trend is a line
of decisions upholding verdicts which-probably in response to public opinion-
absolve employees of liability for negligence, while their "enterprise-masters,"
paradoxically enough, have been held liable for the very negligence of which
2 This result has been achieved by various devices such as the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
and the wholesale "objectivation" of the negligence concept. See infra p. 744.
". .... the defendant must have had at least a fair chance of avoiding the infliction of
harm before he becomes answerable for such a consequence of his conduct. And it is certainly
arguable that even a fair chance to avoid bringing harm to pass is not sufficient to throw upon
a person the peril of his conduct, unless, judged by average standards, he is also to blame for
what he does." Holmes, The Common Law 163 (i8ft). Accordingly Holmes could say that
"it would be possible to state all cases of negligence in terms of imputed or presumed foresight."
Ibid., at 147. "The courts seem unable to rise above the distressingly inadequate and exces-
sively used terminology of medieval morality." Green, Are There Dependable Rules of
Causation?, 77 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 6or, 620 (1929).
23 See Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk, 38 Yale L. J. 584, 720
(1929); Baty, Vicarious Liability (x96); Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 Yale L. J.
io5 (i16). See also Vicarious Liability: Statutes as a Guide to Its Basis, 45 Harv. L. Rev.
171 (1931).
24 See Ehret v. Village of Scarsdale, 269 N.Y. 198, ig N.E. 56 (1935), discussed infra at
p. 736.
'5 Even the "scope of employment" doctrine may sometimes serve this economic policy
consideration.
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their immediate human alter egos, their employees, have been adjudged free.26
This development is further illustrated by the fact that intermediate employees
in control are not held liable for the negligence of their subservants27-an addi-
tional indication that the doctrine of respondeat superior is largely based upon
economic considerations.2
8
Perhaps the main thought under discussion can be most clearly set forth by
indulging briefly in some deliberately fictitious retrospection. Early in the nine-
teenth century the complexity of society was greatly increased by the advent
of organized mechanical enterprises which transformed all branches of social and
economic life. Speculative observers gifted with a social perspective (not alto-
gether unknown in the history of man) may be imagined to have thought in the
following vein. Organized mechanical enterprise is inevitable and useful-but
dangerous. A certain amount of consequent harm to others in the operation of
such enterprise is unavoidable, no matter how carefully its servants are selected
or how carefully they may behave when chosen. Indeed, the application of the
general principle of "fault"'9 with its strict requirements of care in these two
respects may prove unduly expensive and may discourage industrial develop-
ments generally believed of more ultimate importance to society than the
avoidance of this inevitable harm to certain of its members. Society cannot then
penalize enterprise for its negligence in operating with full realization of the
harm it inevitably will cause, after having permitted and even encouraged such
21 Cf. Weil v. Hagan, 166 Ky. 750, 179 S.W. 835 (1915); Dunbaden v. Castles Ice Cream
Co., io3 N.J. L. 427, 135 AUt. 886 (1927); Buskirk v. Caudill, i81 Ky. 45, 203 S.W. 864 (-918);-
Chesapeake & 0. R. Co. v. Dayson's Adm'r, 159 Ky. 296, 167 S.W. 125 (1914); Illinois Cen-
tral R. Co. v. Murphy's Adm'r, 123 Ky. 787,97 S.W. 729 (19o6); Van Gundy v. Packard Motor
Car Co., 1i1 Kan. 636, 229 Pac. 503 (1923). See notes in ii Minn. L. Rev. 568 (1927), 78 U. of
Pa. L. Rev. 904 (r93o), and 16 Col. L. Rev. 164 (1916). But see Rest., Torts § 883, Comment
(1939). 36 Yale L. J. 1026 (1927) speaks of "desirable results based on unconvincing reasons
and distinctions," and correctly states that "the effect of such results is to place the loss on
those in the best position to distribute it among the community, the desirability of which
would appear as great here as in the cases of workmen's compensation." See also Smith, Frolic
and Detour, 23 Col. L. Rev. 444, 456 (1923): "The upsetting of these so-callefi inconsistent
verdicts is an attempt to force juries to conform to the courts' own logical processes-a course
which seems neither practical nor desirable."
27 Brown & Sons Lumber Co. v. Sessler, 128 Tenn. 665, 163 S.W. 812 (1914).
8 "See Steffen, Independent Contractor and the Good Life, 2 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. .o5, 507
(1935): "In all honesty it should be admitted that there are now large areas of employer re-
sponsibility which cannot be accounted for realistically upon a fault rationalization."
29 Although it was said as early as 168i that "in all civil acts the law doth not so much re-
gard the intent of the actor as the loss and damage of the party suffering" (Lambert and Olliot
v. Bessey, T. Raym. *421, *422 (K.B. 1681)), the civil law of torts carried the criminal law
notions of exclusive liability for fault into its independent existence. For a history of civil law
liability see Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 315,
383, 441 (1894); Woodbine, The Origins of the Action of Trespass, 33 Yale L. J. 799 (1924), 34
Yale L. J. 343 (X925).
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enterprise in spite of the certainty of harm.3o Therefore the basis of liability of
organized mechanical enterprise for damage caused by its servants must differ
from that of relatively individualistic undertakings such as the everyday func-
tions of small craftsmen and shopkeepers as well as landowners and people in
general, in which "back-yard" cases the traditional "fault" theory appears ade-
quate. At the same time, society cannot casually leave the losses incident to
relatively dangerous organized mechanical enterprise on the individuals suffer-
ing them. These inevitable risks should be shared so far as possible by those
who benefit from such enterprise. The most obvious medium for effecting this
distribution of loss is the enterprise itself.31 If the risks are everpresent, in-
demnification of those harmed may be absorbed as an overhead cost and may
actually be shifted through increased prices.32 These considerations need not be
restricted to mechanical enterprise but should determine as well the further
development of the liability of all large enterprise.
The inherent conservatism of the law, as well as a reluctance to seem to
regress toward supposedly primitive forms of so-called "absolute liability,"33
militate against frank legislative and judicial adoption in so many words of this
standard of liability complete with its social reasons. While the same result is
attained in terms of the conventional common law negligence categories, it is
important that the true basis of this liability in economic necessity be kept
constantly in mind. Thus, although the courts continue to speak of the liability
of the employees of the enterprise, they impose liability for practically all harm-
ful behavior of the employees in order to shift to the enterprise the losses occa-
sioned by its operation. Language dealing with the servants' negligence serves
then as a substitute basis for the "negligence" of the enterprise itself. No such
30 See Rest., Torts § 520 (1938) where "ultrahazardous" activity involving liability under
§ 519 is defined as an activity that "necessarily involves a risk of serious harm .... which
cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care, and .... is not a matter of common
usage." (Italics added.)
3 1 Any overburdening of a socially desirable enterprise may be avoided by subsidies in the
form either of a reduction of liability (e.g., charitable institutions) or conceivably of state
financial support.
32 Efforts of the management to reduce risks by new safety devices and careful supervision
may be considered an additional advantage arising from loss distribution through the enter-
prise.
3' See Winfield, The Myth of Absolute Liability, 4 2 L. Q. Rev. 37, 46 (1926). In the light of
the discoveries of modem psychology it can hardly be doubted that liability for fault rather
than liability for causation as such was the basis of primitive law. It is because the primitive
mind-like the child's mind-contemplates mere causation as intentional infringement that
retaliation for all harm caused was the first theory of punishment and compensation. The
gradual replacement of the idea of punishment by retaliation and deterrence with measures of
prevention and security in criminal law on the one hand, and with a system of compensation
-without regard to "fault" in civil law on the other, should be considered an entirely new de-
velopment in the history of the law, and-with its renouncement of primitive instincts of
vengeance-should not be hampered by the incorrect assumption that it is a regression. Rather
such a regression would be involved in a reintroduction of the foreseeability test.
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substitution took place in continental Europe, where at first the populace looked
on organized mechanical enterprise as an "enemy"34 and where its negligence is
frequently still irrebuttably presumed in damage suits.35
But liability for the incidental losses of organized enterprise cannot remain
unlimited. This does not mean that the limits of liability should be fixed by
means of the same standards governing liability for the everyday behavior of
"small people"-by a sort of "avoidability test" such as might be used in what
we have termed, in a homely sense, the "back-yard" cases. Because society
wishes to use enterprise merely as a convenient medium for spreading or social-
izing the losses caused by enterprise, liability on this basis can be justified only
for such losses as enterprise is able to spread-that is, for losses which it can
calculate and insure against.36 Here again the courts find it almost impossible
or, perhaps, politically inexpedient to speak in frank terms and are compelled to
resort to the language of common law negligence. Where the hazard is not
typical of the enterprise in question, the courts deny the existence of "duty,"
"proximate causation," "foreseeability" or "negligence." 37 Unfortunately in
such cases the courts use the term "foreseeability" in a sense quite different
from that which they have in mind in the "back-yard" cases, and this difference
of usage has been largely responsible for much of the confusion in our common
law of negligence.
If this speculation is sound, we have in effect two types of liability for
negligence: (i) the older "moral" negligence liability for hazards which could
have been foreseen and avoided by the "guilty" tortfeasor, and (2) the relatively
modern "quasi-negligence" liability 5 for hazards which could not be avoided
but might have been anticipated ("foreseen") as typical of the particular ac-
tivity, and therefore readily distributable by insurance or as an operating cost.
34 See Ebrenzweig, Die Schuldhaftung im Schadenersatzrecht 40 (1936). The Bavarian
Oberappellationsgericht said in a much discussed opinion (Seufferts Archiv I4, 2o8) that "the
operation of a railroad implies negligence necessarily and inseparably." Cf. Winfield, The His-
tory of Negligence in the Law of Torts, 42 L. Q. Rev. 184, 195 (1926): "Early railway trains
.... were notable neither for speed nor for safety. They killed any object from a minister of
State to a wandering cow, and this naturally reacted on the law."
3s See, e.g., Unger, Handein auf eigene Gefahr 85 (I904); Sauzet, Revue Critique i886, at
6o8; 2 Planiol, Trait6 El~mentaire de Droit Civil § 931 (1926).
36 Where, however, the hazard is virtually unpredictable and incalculable, liability might
endanger the stability of the enterprise in question; the victim must therefore either bear his
own loss or receive assistance from public means.
37 For an attempt to classify and analyse the parallel results of the development of the
European law of negligence in a "damage," "causality," "fault!' and "duty" system see
Ehrenzweig, op. cit. supra note 34.
39 Liability for "objective" negligence may be considered as the first expression of this idea
and the "reasonable man" as the first fiction employed in its rationalization. See infra, p. 744.
The much abused "quasi" terminology has been introduced into this note with some re-
luctance. Nonetheless, the historical development of a doctrine which has come to use an
antiquated formula for a new theory of liability seems to justify the choice.
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Recognition of this "dualism" in the negligence concept should be helpful in
understanding and interpreting the Falsgraf case and in the treatment of ques-
tions of foreseeability and causality in negligence cases in general.
IV
The decisions dealing with the liability of enterprise occasionally seem in-
consistent and arbitrary when considered only in light of the foreseeability test
set forth in the Palsgraf case. But this result is to be expected of a theory which
applies the same foreseeability or avoidability test to all situations alike, for the
same abstract test cannot possibly effectuate the different policies underlying
the two kinds of so-called negligence liability. In the "quasi-negligence" cases
the Palsgraf test preserves the antiquated element of moral evaluation ("fault"),
thus rendering liability too narrow in most cases if literally applied. On the
other hand, courts desiring to counteract this tendency and to produce social-
ly desirable results have diluted the negligence doctrines based on moral con-
cepts. But this diluted doctrine, unless carefully administered, is likely to
effect too broad an extension of liability in cases involving the negligent be-
havior of "small people" in the "back-yard" cases, which should be disposed of
only under the "moral" version of the foreseeability test. Indeed, it might even
effect too broad a liability39 in litigation against organized enterprise because of
its failure to emphasize as the focal point for determining the liability of par-
ticular enterprises the "typical" nature of the hazard involved or of the harm
ensuing.
It is submitted, therefore, that the cases may be reconciled and corrected
(i) by distinguishing between the "moral negligence-avoidability" and the
"quasi-negligence or calculable risk distribution" cases and (2) by shifting at-
tention, in determining foreseeability in the latter group of cases, from the
person (agent or servant) actually causing the harm, to the nature of the enter-
prise for which that person was acting. This shift of emphasis must be with
respect not only to the actual circumstances causing the harm but especially
to the calculable risks which are involved in and, in a general sense, fore-
seeably associated with the enterprise under consideration. The practical work-
ing of this suggestion may be illustrated by the analysis of a few cases purport-
ing to follow the Palsgraf case. This limited choice of illustrations is, of course,
arbitrary; but those chosen represent an adequate cross section of the situations
in which the courts have felt most urgently the need for a new limitation of
liability.
In a fairly recent decision of the New York Court of Appeals,40 purporting to
follow the Palsgraf case, servants of a land development company working
39In Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Johnson, i98 Ark. 1134, 133 S.W. (2d) 33 (1939), a railroad
company was held liable for the additional suffering of a tubercular woman from smoke which
spread to her cottage from a railroad fire negligently caused. For an analysis of similar cases see
Harper and Harper, Establishing Railroad Liability for Fires, 77 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 629 (1929).
40 Ehret v. Village of Scarsdale, 269 N.Y. 198, 199 N.E. 56 (1935).
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under a road crossing encased a gas main at right angles inside its much larger
sewer pipe. The company was held responsible for damage caused months later
by entrance of gas into far distant homes through drains connected with the
sewer. The link connecting the liability and the enterprise was said to have been
one of the defendant's workers who had hit the gas main with his pick during
the encasement operation. Liability was expressly based on the company's "re-
sponsibility for the negligence of its servants and employees in the performance
of that work." According to the foreseeability test as applied by Chief justice
Cardozo in the Pasgraf case, therefore, the question should have been whether
the laborer-wrongdoer could have foreseen the hazard created by his act. But
either because the court believed this test unrealistic and far-fetched under the
circumstances or, perhaps, because it assumed a theory similar to that of "enter-
prise-quasi-negligence," judge Lehman used the following language: "In this
case it is plain that by the exercise of reasonable vigilance, the defendant might
have anticipated that gas might leak from a break in the injured gas main at
the point where it was encased in the pipe drain, and that the escaping gas
might find its way into a public sewer or a farm drain in the street and from
there into houses along the street, and endanger life or property in such houses."4'
Here the emphasis is on the general foreknowledge of the company as an enter-
prise dealing with sewers and gas-mains rather than on the specific "negli-
gence" of the workman in question. Whether or not it was intended, this shift
of emphasis tends to justify application of the thesis of this note. 42
While the servant's negligence was at least asserted in this case-the record
reveals the most dubious evidence, if any, in support of it-in other cases
liability can hardly be explained at all on the basis of the foreseeability or
"range of apprehension" test as ordinarily applied. For instance, in another
New York case43 purporting to follow the Palsgraf precedent, a plate glass win-
dow on the second floor of a big department store quite suddenly fell inward,
causing a stampede of custoners beyond the reach of the glass itself, and in the
stampede the plaintiff was hurt. The ensuing liability seems justifiable only if
the foreseeability test is applied to the enterprise as such rather than to uniden-
tified employees considered (unrealistically) to have been under a "duty" to
discover latent imperfections long concealed by paint. This case and others
somewhat similar44 illustrate the growing tendency to extend "quasi-negligence"
41 Ibid., at 207 (Italics added).
42 Cf. Van Alstyne v. Rochester Tel. Corp., 163 Misc. 258, 296 N.Y. Supp. 726 (City Ct.
Rochester 1937).
43 Stanley v. Woolworth Co., 153 Misc. 665, 275 N.Y. Supp. 8o5 (S. Ct. 1934).
44 Cf. Jackson v. Lowenstein & Bros., 136 S.W. (2d) 495 (Tenn. i94o). A rubber mat in
the defendant's department store overlapped a riser on one of the stairways. The plaintiff was
struck and injured by a falling man who had rushed to the aid of his daughter, who, in turn,
had lost her balance when she stepped on the edge of the mat and had fallen down the stairs
with her baby. But see Weiner v. May Department Stores Co., 35 F. Supp. 895 (Cal. i94o),
where recovery was denied to a customer who hurt herself when stepping onto an escalator.
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liability, originally developed in connection with dangerous mechanical enter-
prises, to large organized undertakings of all kinds. Aside from business enter-
prises such as department stores, sports events,4S theaters,4 6 transportation
facilities, apartment houses and hotels,47 which have created special dangers in
concentrating large crowds of people, modem methods of communication have
introduced new potentialities of damage to the pecuniary as well as the purely
personal interests of others. Thus the incorrect transmission of a telegram fre-
quently causes great harm to the parties immediately concerned as well as to
third persons. It is unrealistic and inexpedient to predicate the liability of the
company upon the erring employee's ability to foresee and avoid the conse-
quences of his error, particularly since he is not expected or, perhaps, not even
permitted, to interpret the significance of the message.48 Consistent judicial
practice based upon consideration of the general foreseeability of and insurabil-
ity against errors should rather dictate the extent of liability and thus, indirect-
ly, the scope of justified reliance by addressees and third persons who may be
involved.
Familiarity with personal and property injury cases arising from the use of
automobiles, where damage is not caused by the "moral" negligence of the
driver, such as voluntary drunkenness or reckless driving, suggests that the
predication of liability only upon the operator's ability to foresee and avoid
harm is arbitrary. For in hundreds of these cases, particularly in those involv-
ing technically incorrect reactions, no foresight would have led to prevention of
the driver's "mistake." Thus one motorist was held liable for the death of a
woman who, after a minor collision between her car and that of the defendant,
stepped out of her car, collapsed and broke her skull.49 Two other colliding
automobilists were held liable for the death of a pedestrian who was hit by a
stone falling from an archway struck twenty minutes before by one of the cars
as a consequence of the collision50 The statement that the operators could
reasonably have foreseen such consequences of their driving becomes meaning-
ful only if understood in the sense that everyone knows that automobiling in-
volves inevitable damage as the result of collisions.51 Consideration of auto-
45 Gleason v. Hillcrest Golf Course, 148 Misc. 246, 265 N.Y. Supp. 886 (Mun. Ct. N.Y.
1933); Lamm v. City of Buffalo, 255 App. Div. 599, 233 N.Y. Supp. S16 (1929).
46 Daniels v. Firm Amusement Corp., 158 Misc. 251, 285 N.Y. Supp. 557 (Mun. Ct. N.Y.
1935) (intoxicated person in theater vomiting on patron's clothes).
47 See notes 55 and 56 infra.
48 But cf. Barrus v. W. U. Tel. Co., go Utah 391, 62 P. (2d) 113 (1936).
49 Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N.Y. 231, 177 N.E. 431 (1931).
so In re Guardian Casualty Co., 253 App. Div. 360, 2 N.Y.S. (2d) 232 (1938).
51 See Report by the Committee to Study Compensation for Automobile Accidents (Co-
lumbia University Council for Research in the Social Sciences, 1932). We find a significant re-
mark as to the probable development in Young B. Smith, Compensation for Automobile Acci-
dents: A Symposium, 32 Col. L. Rev. 785, 786 (1932): "In many respects the report reminds one
of the report of the Wainwright Commission in 19io which led to the adoption in New York of
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mobile injury cases from the approach advocated in this note would prevent the
frequent denial of recovery for damage arising from typical highway hazards
such as the projection of a brick or stone at a pedestrian by a passing truck52 or
the harm through vicissitudes of traffic to the occupants of a car being driven in
a line behind the colliding vehicle.53 Certainly some progress might be achieved
in settling the question whether automobile drivers are liable for damage occa-
sioned through shock suffered by onlookers, not themselves in the path of
danger, who nevertheless see the gruesome consequences of collisions and run-
ning-down accidents. Opposite conclusions in such a situation were reached by
two courts, both of which cited the Palsgraf case.54
There is some reason to believe that our courts may reshape the common law
in order to provide compensation for damage arising from another typical
source of recurring hazards-large apartment houses and tenements owned by
corporate landlords. For some decades the spread of "absentee ownership" and
the concentration of great numbers of inhabitants under one roof has threatened
to deprive society of the protection formerly accompanying the personal super-
vision and interest of the individual landlord in his relatively small buildings.
Though still hesitating to take a definite stand on this issue, the New York
courts seem to have held the owners of large dwelling housesss and hotelss6 liable
for instances of typical damage caused by their "enterprise." In line with the
a workmen's compensation act. The striking similarities with respect to the natures of the
problems, the inadequacies of existing laws, the social results thereby produced, and the solu-
tions proposed, cause one to wonder whether this report, as did that of the Wainwright Com-
mission, foreshadows an impending development in the law looking towards a more scientific
distribution of inevitable risks which are incident to an important and necessary activity in
modem society." Compulsory insurance or a state-created compensation fund supplied by
taxation on those who take part in any particular risk-creating activity may be the devices of
the future. See Radin, The Law and Mr. Smith 251 (1938); Radin, Law as Logic and Experi-
ence 72 (x940).
s2 Demjanik v. Kultau, 242 App. Div. 255, 274 N.Y. Supp. 387 (i934).
'3 Farr v. Wright, 248 App. Div. 48, 289 N.Y. Supp. 548 (1936). See also dissent in Kennedy
v. Scott Transportation Co., Inc., 6o F. (2d) 717, 718 (C.C.A. 2d 1932).
S4Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 6o3, 258 N.W. 497 ('935); Frazee v. Western Dairy
Products, i82 Wash. 578, 47 P. (2d) 1037 (x935). Cf. Owens v. Liverpool Corp., [I939] i
K.B. 394, where recovery was granted to a plaintiff who had suffered a mental shock from
watching his cousin's coffin overturned in a collision between the hearse and a tramcar negli-
gently operated by the defendant's servant. For more cases on this subject see Seitz, Duty and
Foreseeability Factors in Fright Cases, 23 Marq. L. Rev. 1o3 (i939).
55 Coughlin v. Jones, 162 Misc. 843, 295 N.Y. Supp. 68i (City Ct. N.Y. i937) (infant play-
ing in rear yard fell into unattached iron grating); Rangel v. 215 Manhattan Ave. Corp., 9
N.Y.S. (2d) 916 (City Ct. N.Y. i939) (tenant hurt when attempting to open defective win-
dow). Cf. Polemenakos v. Cohn, 234 App. Div. 563, 256 N.Y. Supp. 5 (1932) (maintenance of
pit above cellar window); Miller v. El Mirasol, Inc., 163 Misc. 346, 297 N.Y. Supp. 380 (City
Ct. N.Y. 1937) (playing child fell through cellar window).
s6 Schubart v. Hotel Astor, Inc., x68 Misc. 431, 5 N.Y.S. (2d) 203 (S. Ct. 1938); cf. dissent
in Pennock v. Newhouse Realty Co., 97 Utah 4o8, 420, 93 P. (2d) 482, 487 (I939).
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increasing awareness of governments of their responsibilities to individual citi-
zens, the time may not be far distant when courts will openly regard organized
corporate enterprise of all kinds as a sufficiently distinctive factor upon which
to erect a virtual presumption of liability for harm arising from typical and
calculable hazards S7 Even now in certain groups of situations they imply the
inadequacy of the negligence terminology for achieving a satisfactory distribu-
tion of loss. Do judges and jurors any longer seriously ask themselves whether
or not particular hazards could have been foreseen and avoided by railroad
engineers, by automobile operators, by factory hands or construction workers,
or by janitors of great housing enterprises, before holding their principals liable
for damage done to innocent third persons?
Yet we still frequently find decisions which relieve corporate enterprises from
liability for obviously typical harm by using these inadequate and antiquated
formulations of the underlying principles of liability. Such an undesirable result
is illustrated by a decisions8 which has been described9 as the forerunner of the
Palsgraf case. The plaintiff's deceased, riding on a pass in the engine cab of one
of defendant's trains, was killed in a head-on collision caused by the negligence
of the engineer on the other train; the court denied recovery, saying that the
negligent engineer could not have anticipated the presence of the deceased. But
if anticipation were conceded, it obviously could not have affected the engineer's
standard of conduct and thus have prevented the accident. Hence the ration-
alization based on negligence as a concept of relationship seems most unrealistic
indeed. In another line of decisions reliance on the Palsgraf case seems to have
prolonged an obsolete anti-social policy of defeating personal injury claims by
employees against their employers.6°
Perhaps because of the tendency of the courts to continue to think in terms of
concepts and doctrines instead of openly in terms of distribution of losses, it is
at present impossible to determine what they consider calculable "enterprise"
hazards in many situations. For instance, how should courts administer losses
occasioned by publications in newspapers, 61 or what should a court do concern-
ing the claim of one who has depended upon the bond of a surety company
which had been executed in blank by the proper company officials and had then
been left where casual strangers, who "sold" it to the plaintiff, could and did
easily steal it? 62 What of the inevitably recurrent losses arising from the main-
Si Cf. Bernstein v. W. U. Tel. Co., i74 Misc. 74, i8 N.Y.S. (2d) 856 (City Ct. N.Y. 194o).
s Garland v. Boston & M. R., 76 N.H. 556, 86 AtI. 141 (1913).
59 See opinion of L. Hand, J., in Sinram v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 61 F. (2d) 767, 770 (C.C.A.
d 1932).
60 Storm v. New York Tel. Co., 270 N.Y. 103, 200 N.E. 659 (1936); Van Leet v. Kilmer, 252
N.Y. 454, i69 N.E. 644 (1930); Van Buren v. Richmondville, 253 App. Div. 484,3 N.Y.S. (2d)
128 (1939); Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Murray, 40 Wyo. 324, 277 Pac. 703 (1929); Karr v.
Chicago, R.I.& P. R. Co., 341 Mo. 536, io8 S.W. (2d) 44 (1937).
61 See Curry v. Journal Pub. Co., 41 N.M. 318, 68 P. (2d) 68 (1937).
62Benenson v. Nat'l Surety Co., 26o N.Y. 299, 183 N.E. 505 (1932).
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
tenance of ball parks and golf courses?6 3 Should not ordinary hazards of these
enterprises justify the imposition of "quasi-negligence" liability? Constantly
repetitive types of litigated fact situations arising out of such organized enter-
prises as municipal, county and state government undertakings to maintain
sidewalks, roads and highways6 4 as well as other public services dearly call for
the administration of losses through this "quasi-negligence" approach. And cer-
tainly the loose language now employed by the courts and writers should be
avoided in legislation dealing with the liability of enterprise as such. For in-
stance, it is hard to believe that the inclusion of foreseeability terminology in
the section of the Draft for a Uniform Sales Act, i94o, dealing with the regula-
tion of manufacturer's liability 6s will contribute in any way to a clarification of
the economic and social issues there involved."6 On the other hand, an important
step in the right direction seems to have been taken by Section i4 of the Uni-
form Trusts Act 7 which distinguishes enterprise liability68 from liability for
"personal fault" and treats the former like liability "without fault." It is high
time for our courts and our legislatures to adopt a realistic point of view toward
the liability of enterprise for the organized undertakings upon which our popu-
lace is almost completely dependent, and so far as possible in keeping with the
growth of the common law to introduce standards of risk and loss shifting more
63 Note 45 supra.
64 May a city be held liable for injuries caused by defects in the maintenance of its streets?
The courts, referring to the Palsgraf case, have denied liability where a guest in an automobile
was injured when the car collided in a fog with stones negligently placed in a public drive-
way (Birckhead v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 174 Md. 32, 197 AUt. 6x5 (1938)),
and where, because a street was not sufficiently well marked, an automobile driver lost his
way and ran into a body of water (Thompson v. Iouna, 76 F. (2d) 793 (C.C.A. 5th 1935)).
But cf. O'Neill v. Port Jervis, 253 N.Y. 423, 171 N.E. 694 (1930), allowing recovery where a
child, while being conducted around an obstruction on the sidewalk, was struck by an auto-
mobile.
6s Section 28(l) provides: "Where it can reasonably be foreseen that goods, if defective
.... will in the ordinary use thereof cause danger to person or property, the manufacturer
thereof .... assumes responsibility to any legitimate user thereof ..... "
6 The Comment on § 28(1) attempts to reconcile the two theories upon which the present
manufacturers' liability is based, i.e., the warranty theory (i U.L.A. §§ x5-6; Llewellyn,
On Warranty of Quality and Society, 36 Col. L. Rev. 699, 701, 723, 732 (1936)) and the negli-
gence theory (MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. xoSo (I916); Manufac-
turers' Liability-MacPherson v. Buick Comes of Age, 4 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 461 (1937); Rest.,
Torts § 395 (I934)). It is difficult to see how the draft expects to achieve its aim of meeting
economic necessities by introducing the novel concept of "assumption of responsibility" while
maintaining the requirement of foreseeability, the very substance of the law of negligence. As
to related problems in the law of the "repairman's" liability see 8 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 162
(1940).
67 This act was drafted by Professor Bogert, approved by the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws, and adopted in Louisiana, North Carolina, and Nevada.
See 3 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 734 (i935).
68 Such liability is assumed in sections 13 and 14 of the act where "the tort was a common
incident of the kind of business activity in -which the trustee .... was properly engaged."
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closely related to the demands of a well-ordered society than are those developed
at early common law.69
V
Casum sentit dominus, let the loss remain where it falls, is a maxim, the sig-
nificance of which lies chiefly in its exceptions. But to conclude that these ex-
ceptions are apparent in the common law principles of negligence is to leave
them shrouded in doubt. They might, therefore, with profit be realistically re-
stated, if only to indicate the direction of developing policies of loss distribution
for inadvertently caused harm.
i. Cases of harm arising from activities which inevitably create risks to other
members of the community, no matter how carefully they are conducted, clearly
require exceptional treatment. Any such activity which is socially undesirable
should be prevented by punitive sanctions and, being "morally negligent," by
the imposition of liability for all damage it occasions. But if such activities are
socially valuable and therefore encouraged and subsidized or at least tolerated
in spite of their risky character, society will exonerate them from the imputation
of "moral" negligence. Liability will be imposed upon them merely to effect a
just distribution of loss among those who benefit from the activity. If the courts
propose to rationalize this liability under established negligence concepts, they
will have to abandon the traditional emphasis placed on the negligence vel non
of the servant as the only available source of liability and look to the "quasi-
negligence" of the activity or enterprise as such in terms of its foreseeable risks
and generally calculable potentialities of harm. Where both the injuring and the
injured parties are enterprises and even though the hazard is a typical one, it is
arguable that liability should be imposed only on the basis of "moral" neg-
ligence inasmuch as distribution of the loss will be effected, whichever enterprise
bears it.70
2. In other situations, liability must be referred to the personal negligence or
carelessness of individuals in the traditional sense: where harm ensues from
69 But future legislation based on a consistent system of liability might have to consider the
realization of some "principle of the smallest harm" which would distribute the loss in cases
of innocent causation also with regard to the respective wealth of the parties.
An application of this principle to the liability of insane persons and children is contained in
the Austrian Civil Code § i3io. See also German Civil Code § 829: "A person who is ....
not responsible for any damage caused by him, shall, nevertheless, where compensation cannot
be obtained from a third party charged with the duty of supervision, make compensation for
damage in so far as according to the circumstances; e.g., according to the relative positions of
the parties, equity requires compensation, and he is not deprived of the means which he needs
for his own maintenance suitable to his station in life .... and for the fulfilment of his statu-
tory duties to furnish maintenance to others." Translated, Rheinstein, The Law of Torts,
Cases and Materials from Common Law and CivilLaw Countries 9 (ig4o). Fora survey of pre-
war European legislative experiments see Ehrenzweig, Zur Erneuerung des Schadenersatz-
rechtes (1937).
74 See, e.g., Austrian Act Regulating the Liability for Damages Caused by Motor Vehicles
(i90o) § 3, according to which the ordinary rules of absolute liability do not apply to mutual
claims of parties under the act.
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some hazard not generally foreseeable as a risk of the activity or enterprise in
question; or where it is caused by individuals pursuing some everyday "back-
yard" activity or by some small enterprise with which no particularly foresee-
able risk or generally calculable inevitable potentialities of harm to others are
associated.
When individuals or even small enterprises cause harm through intentionally
wrongful conduct or through "moral" negligence, such as drunken driving or the
deliberate disregard of the accepted methods of doing certain things, they will
be expected to compensate for the resulting damage. In such cases no economic
consideration can outweigh the legitimate desire of society to retaliate and de-
ter. But in the absence of such "fault," education and reform of potential
"wrongdoers" might better be left to the criminal side of our law and precedence
be given to considerations of social expediency. A policy allowing recovery by
one party against another in such cases is apparently based on the false assump-
tion that it is more just to place the loss on the innocent "harmdoer" rather than
on the innocent injured person, a paradoxical choice" which somehow implies
that as between innocent parties it is more innocent to receive than to give
harm. Liability for subjectively unforeseeable and unavoidable harm can be
rationalized in terms of negligence only by that fiction of foreseeability and
avoidability which we call the "objective" standard2 of negligence, according to
which the defendant is judged in light of the conduct of the reasonable and
prudent man. This "objective" negligence was designed to become the first
"enterprise" liability independent from purely moral reprehensibility. Alone,
such liability can cover the whole ever-increasing field of enterprise liability only
by diluting its conceptual elements to the extent of destroying its very meaning.
But if, as is here suggested, such liability is supplemented by a kind of enter-
prise or "quasi-negligence" liability, then answerability in damages for so-called
"objective" negligence in "back-yard" cases is susceptible of the necessary re-
striction, in fact as well as in theory, to those consequences which a reasonable
and prudent man could have foreseen and avoided.73 Confining liability in these
cases to foreseeable consequences or to the consequences of foreseeable hazards
amounts, it is true, to the denial of full recovery; but such splitting of the loss
seems more than justified in view of the subjective innocence of the "harm-doer."
It is, perhaps, implicit throughout this note that two essentially different
71 Cf. Gierke, Der Entwurf und das deutsche Recht 167, who called this principle "paradox
but correct." The medieval concept of guilty animals as well as the "faits des choses in-
anim~es" of the French law involves the same primitive psychological attitude.
72 See Seavey, Negligence-Subjective or Objective?, 41 Harv. L. Rev. i (1927); Harper,
Torts 16o (i933)-
73 The imposition of such a restriction would lend support to Professor Gregory's proposed
legislative reform as to contribution among joint tortfeasors against the attack that it is help-
ing to preserve an antiquated system of liability for fault. Gregory, Contribution among Joint
Tortfeasors: A Defense, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1170 (1941); James, Contribution among Joint
Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic Criticism, 54 Harv. L. Rev. ii56 (i94i).
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fundamental notions determine present day civil liability in tort: (i) the re-
taliatory and educational sanction retained in the private law as a hang-over
from its criminal law origin, and (2) compensation according to principles of
economic distribution of loss. Since these two principles are realized within the
one system of common law liability for negligence, the equivocal use of its con-
cepts was inevitable. Thus the unconsciously interchangeable use of the term
"foreseeability" in two entirely different senses, i.e., foreseeability by the wrong-
doer of avoidable harm and foreseeability by an enterprise of unavoidable harm,
has led in the administration of so-called negligence litigation to a confusion
between two competing policies of liability for inadvertently caused damage.
Recognition of this fact by our courts and legislatures should do much toward
clarifying our so-called law of negligence and should obviate most of the con-
fusion of thought revealed in learned disquisitions on "proximate cause" or on
the extension and restriction of liability for inadvertently caused harm.
The administration of our common law negligence has become so arbitrary in
spots that it repeatedly provokes the suggestion that a good deal of so-called
negligence litigation be removed from the common law courts and be handled
under appropriately drafted legislation by commissions acting without juries.
Although this may be the best ultimate solution, the courts seem capable of
achieving almost equally desirable results by openly recognizing the social
needs and tendencies, as well as by consciously adopting the means of achieving
and furthering them, set forth in this note.
With alterations along the lines suggested, the foreseeability test of the
Palsgraf case may remain generally useful and Chief Justice Cardozo's opinion
may attain the position of creative importance which it has never yet firmly
achieved. Thus, perhaps, the "riddle of the Palsgraf case" can be solved without
acceding to Professor Cowan's "motion to bury it."74
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING BY RETAILERS
UNDER TEE FAIR TRADE ACTS
The Miller-Tydings amendment' to the Sherman Act' provides that nothing
in the act "shall render illegal, contracts or agreements prescribing minimum
prices for the resale of a commodity which bears the trade mark, brand, or name
of the producer or distributor of such commodity and which is in free and open
competition with commodities of the same general class produced or distributed
by others, when contracts or agreements of that description are lawful as applied
to intrastate transactions .... in any state .... in which the commodity is to
74 Cowan, op. cit. supra note 3, at 67.
o50 Stat. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C.A. § i (Supp. 194o).
226 Stat. 209 (i8go), i5 U.S.C.A. § i (Supp. 1940).
